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tained. These include mission operational areas and cluster change
control and integrated testing as outlined in our conclusions and recom-
mendations.
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I. SUMMARY
The Skylab program represents a large and potentially significant step forward in
manned space flight. Following closely on the Apollo program, Skylab will, through
medical research and experimentation, through development of mission operations and
work procedures, and by exploitation of many practical applications of space-based ob-
servations, do much to further both the definition of the role and the utilization of the
capabilities of man in space. Such an extension of knowledge and capabilities naturally
introduces many unknowns and new requirements beyond those of its predecessor pro-
grams. It is a new type of space mission. The extended flight duration, the lack of
continuous contact with the ground, its one-of-a-kind nature, the possibility of unfore-
seen on-board human or equipment limitations, and the likelihood of conflicting prior-
ities of real-time operation are either greatly extended by Skylab or new to manned
space flight. It is to these expanded or new elements of space operation that the Panel
has and will continue to direct its major attention during this review.
With its origins found basically in the Gemini and Apollo programs, many sources
of real strength are apparent and fully utilized in Skylab. Outstanding among these
strengths are the technical knowledge and experience of systems engineers, the skill and
professionalism of mission operations personnel, and the effective management neces-
sary to keep the many diverse elements of Skylab properly integrated. Not suprisingly,
the Panel found the hardware composing the separate modules of Skylab to be available
on time and of good quality.
The major challenge immediately ahead, and critical to the integrity of the entire
program, is in two principal areas. One of these areas is the integration and checkout
of the entire Skylab cluster at KSC prior to launch. The second is the method of control
and decision making during the mission itself.
The total Skylab cluster now being assembled at KSC is a spacecraft of great tech-
nical complexity containing a broad scope and wide variety of experiments. The major
modules involve many active interfaces and are being assembled for the first time at
KSC. Integration, testing, checkout, and launch preparations are extensive, and com-
plex tasks are proceeding on a very tight schedule. Overtime work in several areas is
already high; several flight experiments are late; and several significant long-duration
qualification tests are yet to be completed. Since Skylab is the first and only planned
one of its kind, the work force is learning and performing its complex task without the
familiarity with equipment and procedure that is developed by repeated operations.
The quality of the hardware seems good; the management processes in use appear
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effective; and the people on the job are both dedicated and experienced. However, much
remains to be done on a schedule that has few, if any, allowances for unforeseen prob-
lems or surprises. The highly integrated and interactive nature of the cluster makes
work-arounds due to late equipment and apparently insignificant changes a potential
threat to the flight schedule and to the total program execution.
In this situation, it is particularly important that top program management give
very special attention to these early indicators of possible problems ahead. A high
change rate into January or February, the number of work-arounds being required, the
amount of overtime necessary, and the unexpected events or problems experienced in
checkouts are such factors to which management must be particularly sensitive. This
sensitivity coupled with unusually prompt management action can resolve the problems
and exert appropriate controls.
During the mission itself, unexpected events, real-time evaluations, and shifting of
priorities among a multitude of tasks must be expected. While the detailed mission
planning and control of time lines typical of Apollo must be developed as work-planning
tools, the conduct of the mission will require a greater flexibility for immediate re-
sponse to unforeseen limitations or unexpected opportunities. The operation of a long-
duration mission is a new challenge. The procedures and techniques are being developed
and are yet to be proved. This area thus remains a major concern to the panel. The
training and retention of mission controllers and mission management throughout the
long Skylab mission will also be a matter of continuing concern and one deserving of
close attention.
II. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the Administrator, the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel undertook
an extensive review of the Skylab program. The Panel recognized that it could not re-
view all significant activities or management systems. Therefore, priorities in our
fact finding effort were given to those activities and systems we deemed most critical
for crew safety and, then, mission success.
Therefore the Panel reviewed
a. Contractor development and manufacture of Skylab modules and the associated
NASA management activities. This included fact finding trips to principal contractor and
NASA management centers. These activities and our judgments thereon are documented
in the Panel's Interim Report, which was included in the Panel's Third Annual Report.
b. NASA management activities for the evaluation of design and hardware maturity
and mission operations planning and preparation. The Panel attended many of the sig-
nificant internal reviews. Our activities and judgments on these activities are docu-
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mented in this two-volume report. Volume I summarizes the scope of our review and
our findings and conclusions. Volume II provides the supporting detail along with dis-
cussion on more specific items.
The Panel brought to this review questions developed through their individual ex-
periences as executives and program managers. Their questions also reflected past
reviews of the Apollo program. Thus, the members' desire is to provide the Adminis-
trator a perspective and independent judgment not otherwise available in NASA.
III. PANEL REVIEW
A. Scope of Panel Review
This review process combines four fact-finding phases to provide assessment and
recommendations on management systems for hazard identification, risk assessment,
and actions to minimize the effects of these hazards and risks. The first phase covered
NASA and contractor technical management for the development of the Skylab modules.
The second phase covered systems integration and the "design" and "hardware accept-
ance" review process. The third and fourth phases will focus on launch preparations at
KSC and actual mission operations, respectively.
During Phase I the Panel surveyed the principal contractors. This survey provided
a review of those systems having the greatest bearing on crew safety. Particular atten-
tion was given to the module systems for electrical power, environmental and thermal
control, and habitability and crew accommodations. The following management controls
were emphasized: (1) configuration and interface management, (2) vendor control, and
(3) quality control of workmanship. The results of this activity, covering the period
from September 1971 to February 1972, were included in the Panel's Third Annual
Report.
Launch vehicles were reviewed as a part of Phase I. However, fact-finding visits
began subsequent to the issuance of the Panel's Third Annual Report, and the results of
that review are presented in this report. For the modified two-stage Saturn V launch
vehicle, the Panel focused on (1) modifications to accommodate the Skylab payload,
(2) resolution of prior flight anomalies, and (3) changes in personnel and management
systems. For the Saturn I-B launch vehicle the Panel covered possible age-life and
storage problems in addition to those items just noted for the Saturn V.
As previously indicated, the Phase II portion of the Skylab review centered on
(1) NASA program management's visibility and control of contractor operations, (2) sys-
tems engineering and integration, (c) the review process for the evaluation of design and
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flight hardware, and (4) the planning process for mission operations. This was accom-
plished through scheduled Panel meetings at each NASA center and by attendance at
significant NASA-contractor evaluation and hardware acceptance activities.
The schedule of Panel activities during Phases I and II is shown in table I.
To be reported on in the future is Phase III of the review process, which began in
December 1972 at KSC with an initial look at the delivered Skylab hardware and its cur-
rent posture. This phase will also cover the prelaunch period at KSC. Particular at-
tention will be given to two areas: first, mission operation planning including time-line
development, development of rules and procedures for the decision-making process
during the mission, experiment priority, personnel training, and working level mission
operational documentation; and second, KSC test and checkout activities, personnel
skill retention and motivation, and prelaunch review system.
During Phase IV the Panel expects to examine the actual implementation of the
specific mission operation procedures during the 8-month mission period.
B. Criterion for Assessment by the Panel
Primary consideration was given to the ability of the program management to
anticipate and correct problems before they assume serious proportions. In assessing
management actions the Panel examined the following areas:
a. Proof of design and hardware maturity of new and modified elements of GSE,
launch vehicles, and CSM; new Skylab modules and components, OWS, ATM,
AM, MDA, and experiments; and mission launch and operational plans and
required documentation (abbreviations are defined in appendix B)
b. Utilization of safety functions and the risk assessment system
c. Adequacy of the review system to validate compatibility of specifications, draw-
ings, hardware, and test results
d. Test failures and their analysis and resolution
e. Retention of critical knowledge and skills with diminishing contractor and vendor
work loads
f. Program management's ability to integrate NASA-contractor-vendor efforts
C. Procedures
The Panel worked through an extensive data-gathering process whereby Panel mem-
bers form and refine their judgments. Thus, the Panel, as a group or individually,
visited the appropriate NASA centers and contractor sites for presentations on topics of
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significance to the Panel. The Panel also attended internal NASA and contractor deci-
sion meetings to observe the process involved.
The Panel organized its activities to assure that appropriate data were brought
before it. In addition, the agenda for each visit was coordinated by the Panel Chairman
and staff with OMSF and Skylab management to assure the availability of key personnel
to present and discuss such data. The Panel provided this agenda information to the
Deputy Administrator for any additional requirements on items of particular concern to
him. These procedures provide the maximum relevant data upon which the Panel can
make useful judgments.
D. Phase I Assessment - Development and Fabrication of Modules
Based on the Phase I data-gathering activities the Panel noted its observations of
the contractor's management adequacy. These are summarized here and are found in
more complete form in the Panel's Third Annual Report. The Associate Administrator
for Manned Flight and the Skylab Program Manager were most responsive to the Panel's
assessments, and their reply to the report is found in appendix D in this volume.
Policies and Procedures - Contractor policies and implementing procedures for
design and fabrication activities were found to be comparable to those of the Apollo
program. The Panel paid particular attention to and was generally satisfied with the
following areas: (1) systems engineering, (2) configuration management, (3) interface
control, (4) test integration, (5) reliability, and (6) quality and safety. Specific areas
of concern have either been resolved or are being actively pursued by appropriate
management levels.
Planning - Each review provided significant evidence that program planning at all
levels has been thorough and knowledgeable. The utilization of personnel and material
resources as well as standards of performance appear to be under constant management
surveillance. The process has effectively utilized prior government and industry
experience. The planning process has been sufficiently flexible to respond to changing
requirements, fund limitations, and the learning curve. An example of this was the
ability to accommodate the recently approved Earth Resources Experiment Package
(EREP) hardware and associated interface requirements.
Assignment of Responsibilities for Module Development - The Skylab program
management responsibilities were assigned to the various NASA centers as shown in
figure 1, with the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) having the prime responsibil-
ities. All contractors made use of experienced contractor personnel from previous
manned spaceflight programs or related non-NASA activities. NASA management has
been able to support contractor activities with task teams to meet specific test and
manufacturing problems as they have arisen. Senior NASA and contractor management
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have met the challenge posed by diverse contractor locations and decentralized program
management.
Control of Suppliers - The contractors were aware of their responsibilities in areas
involving both in-house manufacturing and supplier activities. In-house monitoring and
auditing sought to maintain a high level of quality and skill and to maximize safety in
such areas as manufacturing processes and personnel training. All contractors indi-
cated problems with one or more suppliers because of the current aerospace business
posture and the relatively small Skylab hardware quantities involved. Control of the
individual contractor's suppliers is a function of their current business load and prior
relations as well as the criticality of individual items of hardware.
Interface Control - As in the Apollo program, Skylab, with its multiple hardware
modules and geographically diverse locations, requires strict interface management
between contractors and NASA centers. NASA directives, implementing procedures,
contract requirements, and collective effort of working level personnel have tended to
minimize interface problems. Apollo-type intercenter working groups, panels, and
Configuration Control Boards (CCB's) continue to be the major force here. Examples
of these activities are (1) Contamination Control Working Group, (2) Stowage Working
Group, (3) Microbiological Working Group, (4) Materials Application and Evaluation
Board, (5) Fire Hazards Steering Committee, (6) Vibroacoustic Test Control Board,
(7) Flight Operations Planning Group, (8) Experiment Operations Panels, and (9) ICD
Panels. We noted that Skylab management reviews showed some lag in the paper system,
some inconsistencies in hardware interfaces in early stages of testing and problems in
relations of experiments to modules. None of these were major in nature. Interface
control at KSC, which will be examined in Phase III, is considered vital, since this will
be the first time the vehicle systems come together as an integrated unit.
Launch Vehicles - This segment of the Phase I review was conducted after the
issuance of the Panel's Third Annual Report. Therefore, it is included here as a sep-
arate Phase I review item, and is covered only in sufficient detail to provide understand-
ing of launch vehicle status.
This review was aimed at determining (1) the status and problem resolution of Sky-
lab launch vehicles and management systems, (2) management ability to maintain tech-
nical excellence in hardware and operations, and (3) interfaces between centers and
contractors. Involved in the review were the Chrysler Corporation (S-IB), The Boeing
Company (Saturn V), and MSFC Launch Vehicle Program Office, and the contractors
for the S-II (North American Rockwell) and the IU (IBM Corporation).
A brief discussion of the Apollo-Skylab mission differences and the history of the
S-IB stages is necessary for an understanding of launch preparation activities. The
first stage of the Saturn I-B built by Chrysler was last used to launch the Apollo 7 mis-
sion on October 11, 1968. The remainder of the stack (S-IV-B and IU) have been flown
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on Apollo missions up to the present time. In the case of the first Skylab launch, SL-1,
the major differences include an abbreviated stack consisting of the S-IC, the S-II, and
a revamped IU which becomes a part of the orbiting cluster. Skylab payload weights
have been shown to be well within the modified launch vehicle capability. Differences
are noted in table III. In the case of the SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4 missions the Saturn I-B
vehicle configuration is essentially the same as that used on the Apollo 7 in 1968. Mod-
ifications include an increase of the H-1 engine rating from 200, 000- to 205, 000-pound
thrust and the ability to use the spacecraft guidance system as backup to the launch ve-
hicle guidance system. The launch from Complex 39B rather than the now inactivated
Complex 37 requires the use of a large pedestal structure because of the difference in
height of the S-IB launch vehicle and the launch tower service arms at this complex.
The first Skylab launch, SL-1, still has a number of open requirements to be ful-
filled. These include (1) control, stability, and dynamics analyses, which should be
available for checking purposes in early 1973, (2) final verification of aerodynamics
analyses, scheduled for the end of 1972 and early 1973, and (3) final analyses of track-
ing and communications requirements, scheduled for early 1973.
During its visit to Michoud and through subsequent information, the Panel examined
the possibility of structural sag for vehicles held in long-term storage, utilization of
MSFC manpower to manage the launch vehicle programs, malfunction vs manpower
history, the consequence of reduced interlocks, and the IBM and General Electric
Company roles. Because the Panel did not visit the last two contractors, it requested
background data on their current activities. With respect to General Electric's role,
the Panel received data on (1) significant problems encountered in building up to meet
contract requirements, (2) their responsibilities on SL-1, SL-2, SL-3, and SL-4 GSE
design, test, installation, manufacturing, and input to KSC operations, and (3) current
and projected manpower levels. With respect to the IBM role, the Panel received data
on (1) manpower history, (2) rationale for specific skill retention, and (3) interface with
other modules since IU-513 is an integral part of the orbiting cluster.
Because the modified Instrument Unit stays with the cluster in orbit, it was sub-
jected to additional extensive qualification tests. During vibroacoustic tests the modi-
fied Skylab IU was found to be more responsive to vibration than the equivalent Apollo
unit. Twenty-two components failed, but after modifications were made all units passed
their qualification retests. Such programs provide a high level of confidence in the
ability of this IU to meet mission requirements.
E. Phase II - Module Acceptance and Cluster Integration
During Phase II the Panel focused on the review system of the NASA centers for
module acceptance and cluster integration. The responsibilities of the NASA organiza-
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tions for systems integration are shown in tables IV to VII. The interrelation is com-
plex but does recognize existing expertise and availability of management effort.
As the Panel reviewed the management systems, the following observations appeared
particularly significant in forming our judgments.
Intercenter Relations - The organizational relations, both within and among centers
and contractors, consist of many horizontal and vertical threads. The Panel through
its fact finding activities was able to survey these relations as actually practiced. The
formal communication and decision-making process, in the main, worked well. The
complex intercenter and intercontractor interfaces resulting from MSC as the flight
operations center utilizing MSFC developed spacecraft modules and individual systems
being distributed across modules have at times resulted in data exchange and decision
delays. They have also raised concerns regarding how Skylab systems design integra-
tion and performance are certified in light of the fact that design reviews have generally
been on a module basis.
The Mathew's Review Board, convened to examine the Skylab program in light of the
Apollo 13 experience, expressed concern in 1971 that past reviews of the overall cluster
appeared to be made on a module-by-module basis. As a result of this, the Skylab
Systems/Operations Compatibility Assessment Review (SOCAR) activities were initiated
in November 1971 and conducted through June 1972. The SOCAR primary objectives
listed below are indicative of its value to the Skylab Program and to the Panel in assess-
ing program status and ability to resolve problems. The SOCAR objectives are
a. To assess the Skylab systems design integration and performance characteristics
based on updated engineering analysis, simulations, and actual hardware test
experience
b. To assess the operational readiness of Skylab through a detailed review of the
mission documentation, plans, and techniques to be used by the operations
team for the conduct of the actual mission
SOCAR did (a) furnish a vehicle for personnel responsible for planning the mission
operational activities to come into direct working contact with those who designed and
developed the hardware, (b) increase rapport between centers and expand upward com-
munications to provide management with better program visibility, (c) provide a forum
for the contractor, principal investigator or their representatives, and center personnel
to discuss problems of mutual concern and to exchange new ideas to resolve new and old
problems on a more timely basis, (d) help to expedite updating and planning for opera-
tional documents such as the Operational Data Book, Skylab Operations Handbook, and
Skylab Flight Mission Rules, and (e) provide an excellent basis for the design certifica-
tion process which followed.
Many of the SOCAR teams did not have KSC participants. This added to the diffi-
culty of examining the compatibility between Skylab Orbital Assembly design and require-
ments from the point of view of KSC responsibility.
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On the whole, however, the SOCAR was a major step in achieving inter- and intra-
center and contractor cooperation, commonality of technical understanding, and con-
tinued motivation and a sense of teamwork. Retaining the framework of the SOCAR
team structure keeps it available as a problem solving mechanism throughout the re-
mainder of the program.
Program Review Process - The Panel observed the Design Certification Reviews
and NASA Hardware Acceptance Reviews to evaluate the maturity of the hardware prior
to delivery to the KSC.
The Design Certification Review (DCR) process is described in Skylab Program
Directive 17, dated March 7, 1972:
"The DCR's are supported by the normal Center design review processes.
They involve examining the design performance and verification of the major
contract end items, the integrated cluster systems, the significant crew and
experiment interfaces and mission operations activity to assess and certify
that the equipment and operational elements can accomplish the planned
Skylab missions. Specifically, the Skylab DCR's are conducted to:
1. Assess and certify the adequacy of the performance design require-
ments and verification programs of the major Skylab end items and
their interfaces as a complete space vehicle system for flight
worthiness and manned flight safety.
2. Assess and certify the design adequacy of the Launch Complex,
Mission Control Center and the Spaceflight Tracking and Data
Network; and
3. Assess and certify compliance with established Safety and Program
Reliability goals. (Numerical reliability goals are excluded). "
The Panel examined the hardware management in terms of the following questions:
(1) How well are the design requirements known and controlled? (2) How well do the
substantiating data prove requirements ? (3) What problems were encountered and
resolved? (4) What are the remaining open items and the assessment of their impact
on KSC ? (5) What are the risks associated with critical items ? (6) What are the risks
associated with waivers and deviations?
The Panel representatives and staff attended those DCR's noted in table VIII. The
following general observations can be made. The press of delayed hardware delivery,
extended qualification testing, and anomaly resolution caused compression of the DCR
schedule. Nonetheless the preparation and conduct of the reviews appear to have been
thorough and to have covered the hardware and test verification. Some areas require
furthur evaluation because of results from such tests as the Skylab Medical Experiments
Altitude Test (SMEAT), the late delivery and test of experiments, and the late plans for
stowage of equipment.
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The coverage of the following areas appeared to be consistently good:
a. Identification of single failure points and rationale for acceptance
b. Identification of critical components for mission and crew safety
c. Caution and warning system analysis
d. Critical/redundant backup components
e. In-flight maintenance
f. Sneak circuit analyses
g. Waivers and deviations affecting reliability and safety
Predelivery and Turnover Review and Spacecraft Acceptance Reviews were con-
ducted to assess module acceptability and its readiness for shipment to KSC. The
reviews were conducted with Headquarters, MSFC, MSC, and KSC present at the con-
tractor's site. Documentation was evaluated in advance to assure a realistic statement
of the readiness of the hardware for launch preparations. Senior management met to
review (1) the manufacturing and test history of the flight hardware, (2) variations from
the design requirements, and (3) the open work to be completed before judgment can be
reached on flight readiness.
In most cases a "walk-through inspection" was made by a team of qualified experts
from the development centers to cover visible manufacturing quality, safety items, and
general vehicle condition.
The "give-and-take" approach taken in these reviews produced constructive debate
on every aspect of the design, fabrication, test, and end use of the hardware.
These reviews appear to have been effective in providing hardware and software
that fulfill the end item specifications.
Skylab Medical Experiment Altitude Test (SMEAT) - During the Panel's attendance
at the various in-house reviews the impact of the SMEAT was discussed. The SMEAT
was a 56-day chamber test performed at MSC with a three man crew. The primary test
objective was to obtain and evaluate baseline medical data on those medical experiments
which reflect the effects of the Skylab environment. In addition, this test evaluated data
reduction and data handling procedures.
Many hardware and operational problems surfaced during the test. Most of these
appear to have been resolved, and those that remain concern the medical ergometer,
the metabolic analyzer, and the redesign of the urine collection system. In addition,
the Skylab mission time lines being developed at MSC will take into account the crew
experience with the medical tests and housekeeping requirements.
The Panel was assured that a concerted effort was under way to resolve all the
problems in a timely manner. A final report is expected on SMEAT in January 1973.
The Panel intends to examine this area further during Phase m to assure closure
of open items and to develop an understanding of any impact on the work load at KSC.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, the Panel is satisfied with (1) the technical management system for
development and fabrication of the modules, spacecraft, and launch vehicles, (2) the
process of design and hardware acceptance reviews, and (3) the risk assessment activ-
ities. Areas requiring management attention in the period ahead are (1) checkout
activity, (2) integrated testing, and (3) preparations for and execution of mission opera-
tion.
1. The large extension of man's role in space afforded by Skylab presents many new
challenges to the various echelons of program management. Among these new elements
of manned space flight are the extended mission duration, the absence of continuous
contact with the ground, the first-of-a-kind nature of the hardware and mission, the
very complexity and scope of the equipment, and the need for flexibility of response to
unforeseen limitations or opportunities during the mission. To date, program manage-
ment has been able, within the limits of available experience and knowledge, to respond
to these new challenges and resolve the many new problems and requirements that have
been encountered.
2. The technical management system for design and fabrication of the modules
appears adequate based on our review of contractors and the results of the design certi-
fication and module acceptance reviews.
3. The traditional system safety and reliability functions were augmented with a
number of special working groups. They considered such areas as critical mechanisms,
electric circuit malfunctions, and microbial and contamination control. The Panel is
satisfied with the comprehensiveness of this risk assessment effort. Apollo experience
was used in the systematic identification and evaluation of Skylab efforts. Finally,
while there are flammable materials on board, the risk associated with them has been
evaluated by management. This risk has been minimized by isolating flammable mate-
rials from ignition sources and propagation paths. This is a prudent and reasonable
approach.
4. Cluster integration and the compatibility of the systems with operating require-
ments have been under review by numerous working groups, intercenter panels, and
SOCAR. The system of review was generally satisfactory. However, the full effective-
ness of system integration can be better evaluated after KSC testing.
5. Since the Skylab CSM's are a modification of the very successful Apollo CSM's
and the contractor appears to be maintaining the technical management systems and
skills, the Panel has a high degree of confidence in the capability of the CSM to do its
assigned job. Past Apollo anomalies have been evaluated for their impact on Skylab.
6. In the Panel's opinion the launch vehicle stages have received the necessary
attention during storage. The system for poststorage checkout and review appears
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comprehensive. Modifications made to the stages do not impact crew safety. While
launch teams for the Saturn V are present from Apollo, the development of new teams
with appropriate skills for the S-IB will require continuing management attention.
7. Checkout and launch preparations of the cluster will be more extensive than
those for Apollo because of the complexity of the modules and the number of interfaces
involved. Module systems will be integrated into the cluster configuration for testing.
Many of these interfaces will be functionally integrated for the first time. Experiments
and other stowage items still have to be fitted aboard the modules. Problems will un-
doubtedly occur. Therefore, senior program management will need to closely monitor
the system for the resolution of these problems to assure that risk assessment is ac-
complished at the appropriate level of management.
Based on the Apollo learning curve the operation of ground support equipment will
again have to be carefully planned and controlled to avoid overexcitation of flight sys-
tems during test activities.
8. In order to obtain a confidence factor in qualifications by "similarity, " the
Panel requests a review of those problem areas encountered during checkout at KSC,
where the item had been previously qualified by similarity rather than actual testing.
9. The extensive checkout and launch preparations of the cluster are to be com-
pleted within a tight schedule having a minimum of "unscheduled time" available for
additional work. Therefore, senior program management must control additional work
and be prepared to respond promptly to early indications of problems. Among those
factors warranting particular management attention are (1) a high change rate in
January and February, (2) the amount of overtime necessary, and (3) the unexpected
events or problems experienced in checkout.
10. The Skylab program provides more opportunities for experiments and astronaut
activities than can be accommodated during the available mission time. This must be
accepted by all to assure realistic expectation of mission activities and results. Prior-
ities will have to be maintained and time lines carefully planned accordingly. Adequate
time must be provided for crew rest and personal requirements.
While the detailed mission planning and control of time lines typical of Apollo must
be developed as work planning tools, the conduct of the mission will require a greater
flexibility of response to accommodate unforeseen limitations or unexpected opportuni-
ties. Additional scientific opportunities will undoubtedly be discovered in flight. House-
keeping and experiment tasks may take more time in orbit than planned. This will
require that the initial time line not be fully committed. Also, it will require a manage-
ment system to revise priorities and time lines during the mission. The flow of infor-
mation to mission controllers, the assembly and display of this information to mission
managers, and procedures for near-real-time evaluation and operational decisions are
areas requiring management's attention in the period ahead.
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11. A number of significant open items and concerns noted by the Panel are high-
lighted as areas for further attention. The pace of the Skylab program and the normal
problem solving process will to some extent have already closed or provided planned
closures for a good many of the items noted. However, further test and checkout ex-
perience may indicate that, in fact, some may not have been successfully closed.
Therefore, the Panel requests it be informed as to the final disposition made of the open
items noted here.
a. The Skylab Medical Experiment Altitude Test (SMEAT). This test appeared
successful in meeting the objectives set. It did, however, surface a number of hardware
and operational problems. The more significant open items include
(1) Ergometer anomalies
(2) Urine collector insufficiency
(3) Metabolic analyzer anomalies
b. MSFC support of medical experiment hardware. The extent and mode of MSFC
participation prior to and during the mission in support of medical experiment hardware
developed by MSFC should be resolved at the earliest date. The hardware includes the
ergometer and the metabolic analyzer.
c. Sneak Circuit Analysis status.
d. Testing to complete the Corona assessment.
e. Suit drying station problems and suit availability for emergencies.
f. Crew procedures for reaction to the loss of cluster pressure.
g. Results of further studies on the susceptability of the crew to dangers inherent
in the inhalation of particulates during a mission.
h. Completion of hardware verification through qualification testing. At the time of
the Panel review in November 1972 the qualification test status was
Module Tests Remaining
Orbital Workshop 28
Airlock Module 10
Multiple Docking Adapter 0
Apollo Telescope Mount 4
Payload Shroud 1
i. Closure of three major open items on CSM:
(1) Adequacy of the tension-tie cutter and explosive charge system
(2) Qualification of the descent battery
(3) The discharge and/or safing of the RCS propellant system during reentry
j. Evaluation of Apollo 17 anomalies for their impact on Skylab cluster, launch
vehicle hardware, and ground support equipment.
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APPENDIX A
PANEL AUTHORITY
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel was established under Section 6 of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, 1968 (PL 90-67, 90th
Congress, 81 Stat. 168, 170).
The duties of the Panel are set forth as follows:
"The Panel shall review safety studies and operations plans referred to it and
shall make reports thereon, shall advise the Administrator with respect to the
hazards of proposed or existing facilities and proposed operations and with respect
to the adequacy of proposed or existing safety standards, and shall perform such
other duties as the Administrator may request. "
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APPENDIX B
ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND DEFINITIONS
Skylab Orbital Assembly
AM Airlock Module
MDA Multiple Docking Adapter
OWS Orbital Workshop
CSM Command and Service Module
ATM Apollo Telescope Mount
IU Instrument Unit
Major Module Systems
ECS Environmental Control System
TCS Thermal Control System
EPS Electrical Power System
HSS Habitability Support System
CAS Crew Accommodation System
SAS Solar Array System
Other Major Hardware
PS Payload Shroud
L/V Launch Vehicle
SAT-V Saturn V Launch Vehicle
SAT-IB Saturn IB Launch Vehicle
GSE Ground Support Equipment
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
MCC-H Mission Control Center - Houston
LCC Launch Control Center
EREP Earth Resources Experiment Package
C&D Control and Display
- - -Skylab Reviews, Mission Terms
SOCAR Systems/Operations Compatibility Assessment Review
DCR Design Certification Review
PDTR Predelivery and Turnover Review
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COFW Certificate of Flight Worthiness
FRR Flight Readiness Review
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
SFP Single Failure Point
SMEAT Skylab Medical Experiments Altitude Test
EVA Extravehicular Activity
SL-1 First Skylab Launch: Saturn V and Orbital Assembly less CSM
SL-2 Second Skylab Launch: Saturn IB with CSM 116
SL-3 Third Skylab Launch: Saturn IB with CSM 117
SL-4 Fourth Skylab Launch: Saturn IB with CSM 118
NASA and Industry Organizations
OMSF Office of Manned Space Flight, Washington, D. C.
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama
MSC Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas
KSC Kennedy Space Center, Florida
MDAC-W McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California
MDAC-E McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, St. Louis, Missouri
MMC Martin Marietta Corporation, Denver Division, Denver, Colorado
NR North American Rockwell Corporation, Downey, California
Definitions
Saturn Workshop The in-orbit space assembly which includes the Orbital
Workshop (OWS), Airlock Module (AM), Multiple
Docking Adapter (MDA), and Apollo Telescope Mount
(ATM)
Orbital Assembly The Saturn Workshop plus the docked CSM
Group-Related Experiments Experiments that are closely related to each other either
through common focus of study or by integration into a
single subsystem; these are the medical, solar as-
tronomy (ATM), and Earth resource experiments
Corollary Experiments Experiments other than group-related or passive type
that require significant in-flight crew support and are
not closely related to each other
Passive Experiments Experiments whose associated in-flight crew support re-
quirements are almost nonexistent
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Constraint A restriction that influences the mission profile, or
time line, and for mission planning purposes cannot
be violated
Single Failure Point (SFP) A single item of hardware which, if it failed, would lead
directly to loss of a part, system, mission, or crew
member
Principal Investigator (PI) An individual that NASA has contracted with for the de-
velopment and delivery of experiment hardware,
analyses of returned data, or both
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APPENDIX C
SKYLAB MISSION DESCRIPTION
The Skylab program capitalizes on the capabilities and resources developed in the
Gemini and Apollo programs. It has been established for four explicit purposes: (1) to
determine man's ability to live and work in space for extended periods, (2) to extend
the science of solar astronomy beyond the limits of Earth-bound observations, (3) to
develop improved techniques for surveying Earth resources from space, and (4) to in-
crease man's knowledge in a variety of other scientific and technological regimes.
The Skylab will function throughout three long-duration manned flights and two
intervening periods of unmanned operation. A different three-man crew will inhabit and
operate the orbital assembly as a habitable workshop and will perform a number of
physical science, biomedical science, Earth applications, and space applications ex-
periments. Certain experiments and tests will be performed under ground control
during the unmanned periods. The deployed space vehicle is shown in figure 2, and the
baseline mission data are shown in table IX.
The Orbital Workshop has crew provisions, living quarters and food preparation
and waste management facilities for the three-man crew, plus a large number of mis-
sion experiments. It is flanked by two solar arrays generating electrical power. The
Workshop is to be deactivated between manned missions and left in orbit, awaiting the
arrival of the next Skylab crew. The OWS is a modified Saturn V, S-IV-B stage.
The Airlock Module provides a pressurized passageway for the crew and can be
readily depressurized for extravehicular activity. It is also the supply, distribution,
and control center for the atmosphere and thermal control of the cluster; and it con-
tains equipment for electrical power control and distribution and supports the communi-
cation system.
The Multiple Docking Adapter serves as the interface for linking Apollo Command
and Service Modules with the cluster. It contains controls and displays for the Apollo
Telescope Mount plus storage areas for equipment.
The Apollo Telescope Mount is a solar observatory enabling observation, monitoring,
and recording of the structure and behavior of the Sun. The system provides attitude
control and experiment pointing for the entire cluster. Power is provided by the
windmill-like solar array.
The Apollo Command and Service Modules are much like those for lunar missions,
but are modified to extend life of the modules for the prolonged periods when they are
docked to the MDA of the Skylab. Additional modifications have been made to accom-
modate the many different items being brought back for ground based study.
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o SKYLAB - MANNED ORBITAL SCIENTIFIC SPACE STATION
FIGURE 2
Other components of the basic Skylab Space System include the Saturn V launch
vehicle, used to place the orbital cluster (OWS, AM, MDA, ATM) into Earth orbit in
an unmanned condition; the Payload Shroud, used to protect and support the upper por-
tion of the cluster during the boost period; the Saturn IB launch vehicles, used to put
the CSM's in orbit; and the supporting ground equipment.
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APPENDIX D
RESPONSE TO PANEL'S INTERIM REPORT
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
-
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
c.A.
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: MQ JUN 2 7 1972
MEMORANDUM
TO: A/Administrator
FROM: M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight
SUBJECT: Third Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel
The subject report has been reviewed by both the Apollo and Skylab
Program Offices with copies made available to Center Program Offices
and concerned contractors.
The Apollo Program Office has participated with the Panel in its activities
and is aware of each of the points noted in the report. The Panel has
received thorough briefings here in Wasnington, at the MSF Centers.
and at various contractor plants concerning areas of particular interest
to the Panel, as well as others selected by the Apollo Program Office for
the general interest of the Panel.
In the case of Skylab, the report was written part way through the Panel
review cycle, and most of the questions raised by the Panel have been
addressed in subsequent meetings with the Skylab Program Office. The
attached Skylab report addresses all of the Panel's questions. A final
meeting with the Skylab Washington staff will be held in August, where
any remaining questions can be answered.
I feel that the actions taken and those presently underway in both the
Apollo and Skylab Programs are properly directed towards maintaining
a high degree of safety and mission-success. I appreciate the efforts of
the Panel members and feel the comprehensive series of reviews has
s nificantly contributed to both the Apollo and Skylab Programs.
ale D.My a
Enclosures
Skylab Report
ASAP Report
cc: ASAP Panel
.... -- : . ... . ..2 5
pniriMC 1 PAGE1 BLANK NOT ETJM
AND
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546
REPLY TO 8 JUN I
ATTN OF: MQ JUN
MEMORANDUM
TO: M/Associate Administrator for Manned Space
Flight
FROM: ML/Director, Skylab Program
SUBJECT: Comments on Third Report of the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel
I have reviewed the subject report and have extracted
from it Skylab areas of question or concern as expressed
by the Panel. Attached is a detailed response or status
report on actions underway for each of these areas.
Several answers have been provided jn ASAP meetings held
since report publication, but these are nevertheless
included for the record.
I appreciate the efforts expended by the Panel in their
comprehensive reviews and hope that any remaining areas
of concern can be addressed at our final meeting in
Washington scheduled for August 1972.
William C. Schneider
Attachment
a/s
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Areas of Concern and Responses to These Areas
1. Page 14 of Report
"Contractor policies for Joint operational activities,
e.g., between MDA/AM (Martin Marietta and MDAC-E), indicates
that this area required additional attention at the time
of the Panel review."
Response - Concern was valid and is a continuing area
of attention. Working interfaces had been pre-planned
through a group of documented interface working agreements
but these did not contain some of the more detailed sub-
ective problems which have surfaced as a result of working
together. In retrospect, many of the problems could not
have been anticipated in pre-planned agreements and needed
the actual face-to-face exposure to bring them to light.
Examples are:
a. Difference In cleanliness between Martin Marietta
and MDAC-E clean rooms. This turned out to be primarily a
question of degree of discipline on things like personnel
access controls, carry-in materials, associated documentation,
etc. rather than a fundamental difference in requirements.
b. Difference of opinion on degree of detail which
should be written into factory checkout procedures for flight
crew participation as prepared by MSFC contractor, MDAC-W and
as reviewed by MSC Flight Crew personnel.
Both of these subJective kinds of differences have been
and will continue to be resolved by quick management actions
as they surface.
2. Page 23 of Report
"In the MDAC-W response the question of fire extinguishment
and toxicity controls is one that appeared to require further
examination."
Page 31 of Report
"In light of the Panel's interest in control of toxicproducts produced by fire, the Panel asked whether there were
any materials (in sufficient quantity) aboard Skylab whose
combustion products might poison or render unusable, elements
of the ECS such as the molecular sieve."
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2Response - The question of materials selection for
toxicity o combustion products is actually a paradoxical
one. Skylab has selected materials whose flammability
oharacteristics in the Skylab application are primarily
either non-burning or self-extinguishing. The paradox lies
in the act that generall , the better a material's
flammability characteristics are, the more toxic its
combustion products. Skylab has chosen to use the selection
approach, which either will eliminate or limit the size of
the fire. The proposed contingency action to counteract
toxic combustion products is an operational solution -
isolate the crew from such products via portable masks and
oxygen bottles, extinguishing the fire if deemed advisable,
retreating to the CSM and venting cluster atmosphere,
followed by a bake-out of MOL sieves and re-pressurization
with a new atmosphere.
At the request of the Washington Program Office, MSFC
ran a group of widely-used, typical spacecraft materials
through combustion tests to determine their effects on ECS
components. The tests validated the above described
operational solution and these results were presented to the
Panel at the MSFC meeting held after publication of the
ASAP Report.
An additional detailed briefing by the Headquarters
Skylab staff on this entire area is on the agenda for the
Washington Program Office meeting with the Panel now
scheduled for August 1972.
3. Page 25 of Report
"With respect to the flammable material question, the
Panel feels that consideration should be given to related
activities conducted by independent organizations such as
the NASA Safety Office and the Spacecraft Fire Hazard
Steering Committee."
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3Response - Both the NASA Safety Office (via their OMSF
co-located personnel) and the SFHSC have been very much
involved in all the developments associated with the fire
detection and extinguishment developments as well as the
materials selection prog:am being utilized on Skylab. In
fact, the SFHSC provided results of their fire sensor
studies which influenced the program to go to the U-V
sensors. Mr. Guy Cohen, who is a member of the SFHSC has
repeatedly briefed the Committee on all aspects of the
flammability and fire extinguishment status of the program
and has factored recommendations from the Committee into the
program.
4. Page 29 of Report
"In discussing the test programs it became apparent that
validation of hardware by 'similarity' had one area of
concern - namely, hardware endurance to meet the Skylab
eight month mission time. The rationale in most cases is
sufficient based on the function, usage and failure category,
but in a system such as the EPS and ECS where components are
life tested separately there is always the question of what
would be the effect on such life tests if components were
played together during the same period."
Response - In the ECS system, above information is
incomplete. Long duration tests are being run on the active
elements of the ECS as a system in-addition to component life
test.
In the EPS, the program has consciously focused on active
items subJect to possible wearout and run long duration tests
on such sub-systems and components (e.g. charger battery
regulator modules as a sub-system and also inverter assemblies).
On the OWS, key sub-systems of the refrigeration system
(e.g. pump package assemblies) are being run for long
duration.
To adequately pick up additional "playing together
problems" electrical system breadboards are being run for
extended periods with parametric type testing, for procedure
validation, for malfunction and for contingency procedure
training for both flight and ground crews.
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45. Page 29 of Report
"The materials program as described, including those
hardware items using the mal coatings to achieve specific
0(/E (absorptivity/emissivity) ratios did not indicate the
utilization of data obtained from unmanned vehicle programs
in which long duration in a space environment is the norm,
e.g. the results of the Surveyor data obtained from the
Apollo 12 mission."
Response - Results of the Surveyor items returned from
the Moon by Apollo 12 have been published in two. reports:
1. "Surveyor III Parts and Materials-Evaluation
of Lunar Effects" - Hughes Report No. SSD00628R -
January 22, 1971
2. "Results of Tests of Surveyor III TV Camera" -
Hughes Report No. SSD00545R - January 22, 1971
Approximately 150 copies ( the report were distributed,
including 50 universities and to paint and optical specialists
at:
IITRI Eastman Kodak
GE MDAC-E
Grumman Comsat
Lockheed LaRC
Martin Marietta MSFC
North American MSC
TRW GSFC
Aerospace ARC
Bendix JPL
Representatives of the above organizations attended a
meeting at JPL in January 1971 at which the results were
discussed.
Note that IITRI (Illinois Institute of Technology Research
Institute) is our supplier for the S13G thermal paint being
used on Skylab.
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6. Page 33 of Report
"A problem with principal investigators for medical
experiments was noted in that the PIs are only 'one-deep'
in many cases and may require qualified PI backup."
Response - Today's status is that there is a co-
principal investigator for 13 of the 16 medical experiments.
In al cases however, there is in addition to the PI and the
co-P, a Principal Coordinating Scientist whose responsibility
it is to oversee and integrate all efforts within a body system
or functional area. It is felt that this provides adequate
coverage for the program of medical experiments.
7. Page 37 of Report
"Currently mission-level critical item status, a part of
mission level FMEA effort, is such that some 32 items out
of 49 submitted in 1971, are still under review."
Responge - The mission level FMEA is an on-going program
and as such, it seems most appropriate to provide an update
on current status:
As of May 31, 1972, there are now 95 critical item
candidates identified. These are classified as follows:
70 Single Failure Points
20 Critical Backup Redundant Components
5 Launch Critical Components
Disposition action has been taken on 47 of these
candidates.
Note: At time of above report item, wherein 49 items
had been identified, the FMEA was. at revision level "B."
Since that time, revision "C" was released with 29 items and
revisiop "D" was Just released with an additional 17 items.
This effort is being carefully tracked for program
impact and pressure is being maintained to complete it. It was
also the subject of a significant finding at the recently
completed Headquarters R&QA Audit of MSFC, identified asitem #C-29 of the audit report.
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TABLE I
SCHEDULE OF PANEL ACTIVITIES
PHASE I
September 14-15, 1971 Washington, D.C. (OMSF and Skylab Program)
October 18-19, 1971 McDonnell Douglas, Huntington Beach, California
November 8-9, 1971 McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Missouri
December 13-14, 1971 Washington, D.C. (Life Sciences Division)
January 10-11, 1972 Martin-Marietta Corporation, Denver, Colorado
February 14-15, 1972 North American Rockwell Corporation, Downey,
California
March 13-14, 1972 Chrysler/Boeing/MSFC Launch Vehicle, Michoud,
Louisiana
PHASE II
April 10-11, 1972 MSFC, Skylab Program Office, Huntsville,
Alabama
May 8-9, 1972 MSFC, Skylab Program Office, Houston, Texas
June 12-13, 1972 KSC, Skylab Program Office, Cape Kennedy, Florida
June 19-23, 1972 OWS Pre-DCR, McDonnell Douglas, Huntington Beach,
California
July 13, 1972 MSFC Skylab Experiments Pre-DCR, Huntsville,
Alabama
July 27, 1972 Saturn I-B Turnover Meeting, Michoud, Louisiana
August 10-11, 1972 Formal DCR for CSM and Selected MSC Experiments,
MSC, Houston, Texas
August 31-September 1, 1972 Pre-DCR Mission Operations, MSC, Houston, Texas
September 5-6, 1972 OWS, PDTR at MDAC-West, Huntington Beach, California
September 12-14, 1972 ATM Product Turnover Review, MSC, Houston, Texas
September 15, 1972 DCR for Mission Operations, MSC, Houston, Texas
September 28, 1972 SMEAT Review, MSC, Houston, Texas
September 27-29, 1972 AM/MDA Acceptance Review, MDAC-East, St. Louis,
Missouri
October 2-3, 1972 DCR-Module and Experiment Hardware, MSFC, Huntsville,
Alabama
November 9-10, 1972 Washington, D.C. (Skylab Program Up-Date)
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TABLE II
MSFC END ITEM DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
ITEM CONTRACTOR
Saturn Workshop McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Airlock Module McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Payload Shroud McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiple Docking Adapter MSFC (Structural Design and Fabrication),
Martin Marietta Company (Final Assembly
and Experiment Integration)
Apollo Telescope Mount MSFC
Selected Medical Experiments MSFC (in Support of MSC)
Launch Vehicles Apollo Furnished
Assigned Experiments MSFC, Various PI's and Contractors
Systems and Payload Integration MSFC, Martin Marietta Company
TABLE m
SATURN V LAUNCH VEHICLE
Skylab (SL-1) Apollo
Vehicle Configuration Skylab Workshop Payload Apollo Lunar Landing Payload
Boost Acceleration Limit 4. 7 g 4.0 g
S-IC Shutdown Sequence 1-2-2 1-4
Terminal Stage S-II S-IVB
Orbital Mission Requirements Initial Attitude Control Signals Attitude Control Signals, Maneuver
and Deployment Sequencing for and Deployment Sequencing,
the SWS; Structural Support Maneuver Computations
for 8 Months
Launch Azimuth 40. 880 72 to 1000
Tower Clearance Maneuver Yaw and Pitch Yaw
Crew 0 3
Emergency Detection System Open Loop Closed Loop
Eliminate Abort Feature Abort Capability
Retain Critical Functions T/M Critical Functions T/M
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TABLE IV
NASA HEADQUARTERS (OMSF) ROLE
DETERMINATION AND INTERPRETATION OF REQUIREMENTS
Program objectives
Technical and scientific (e. g., PI's data requirements)
Higher authority (e. g., PAD)
DEVELOPMENT AND ISSUANCE OF PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS
Program specification
Work authorization directive
Program plans and requirements document
Level I schedules and resource plans
Experiment management procedures
Policy letters
Program plans and requirements documents
COORDINATION, IMPLEMENTATION, AND FEEDBACK
Intercenter panels, CCB's, ICD's
Formal reviews (e.g., PDR, CDR, Programmatic)
Formal reports
Frequent visits and teleconferences
Skylab executives' meetings
NEW DIRECTIVES TO CENTERS
CCB directives
Revisions to formal plans (e. g., schedule, work authorization)
Other directives
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TABLE V
MSFC ROLE
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION
Direction and Conduct of Systems Engineering Development
and Verification Testing
Conduct of Integrated Technical Reviews and Assessments
Establishment of Development Requirements and System Veri-
fication Plans to Assure Totally Integrated Systems
Development and Verification of Orbital Assembly and Launch
Vehicle Software Programs
Control of Systems Level Documentation and Performance of
Systems Trade Studies and Analyses
Above Activities Are Performed in Concert With MSC, KSC, and
Headquarters, Using Facilities Best Suited to Accomplish the
Testing; Examples:
Neutral buoyancy training by MSC at MSFC
Integrated payload vibration and acoustic testing at MSC
Cluster systems testing at KSC
Thermal vacuum testing at MSC
MODULE MODIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Orbital Workshop
Airlock
Multiple Docking Adapter
Payload Shroud
ATM System
ATM Experiments
Experiments
Module GSE
Launch Vehicles
Launch Vehicle GSE
DEVELOPMENT OF CERTAIN MEDICAL EXPERIMENT HARDWARE
AND THE MEDICAL EXPERIMENT SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MSC
EXPERIMENT DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR
32 EXPERIMENTS
Science (9)
Medical (1)
Technical (21)
Operational (1)
STUDENT EXPERIMENT RESPONSIBILITY (19)
EXPERIMENT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
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TABLE VI
MSC ROLE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CSM, SLA, AND SUPPORTING GSE
DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTED EXPERIMENTS AND SUPPORTING GSE
PROVISION AND TRAINING OF FLIGHT CREWS
DEVELOPMENT OF CREW SYSTEMS, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, FOOD,
AND OTHER CREW-SUPPORT HARDWARE
SELECTED DESIGN VERIFICATION TESTS
MISSION ANALYSIS, INCLUDING MISSION REQUIREMENTS
DEVELOPMENT AND FLIGHT PLANNING
EXECUTION OF MISSION CONTROL, FLIGHT OPERATIONS,
AND RECOVERY ACTIVITY
MISSION EVALUATION
EXPERIMENTS (31)
Medical (17)
Solar physics (1)
Earth observations (6)
Astrophysics (3)
Crew operations (1)
Technology (3)
EXPERIMENT SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
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TABLE VII
KSC ROLE
CONDUCTS SKYLAB LAUNCHES
ASSUMES READINESS RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL HARDWARE
THAT IS LAUNCHED
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR LAUNCH FACILITIES AND THEIR READINESS
CONDUCTS TESTS AND CHECKS OUT ALL HARDWARE AND DOES
TROUBLE SHOOTING
DOES HAZARD AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING
PARTICIPATES IN
Requirements reviews
Design reviews
Intercenter panels
Change impact reviews
Changes resulting from KSC activities
TABLE VIII
REVIEWS ATTENDED BY PANEL AND STAFF
Design Certification Reviews
Orbital Workshop, Pre-DCR June 19-23, 1972
Experiments, MSFC Responsibility, Pre-DCR July 13, 1972
Command and Service Module, Formal DCR August 10-11, 1972
Mission Operations, Pre-DCR August 31-Sept. 1, 1972
Formal Mission Operations DCR September 15, 1972
Formal Module and Experiments DCR October 2-3, 1972
Formal Cluster DCR October 19, 1972
Predelivery and Turnover Review and Spacecraft Acceptance Review
Saturn I-B PDTR July 27, 1972
Orbital Workshop PDTR September 5-6, 1972
ATM PDTR September 12-14, 1972
AM/MDA SAR September 27-29, 1972
38
TABLE IX
SKYLAB MISSION DATA
Mission SL-1 and SL-2 SL-3 SL-4
Objectives Establish the Skylab orbital Perform unmanned Perform unmanned
assembly in Earth orbit SWS operations SWS operations
Obtain medical data Reactivate the Reactivate the
orbital assembly orbital assembly
Perform in-flight experiments
Obtain medical data Obtain medical data
Perform in-flight Perform in-flight
experiments experiments
Space vehicle/launch SL-1 SL-2 SL-3 SL-4
Launch vehicle Saturn V Saturn IB Saturn IB Saturn IB
(S-IC and SII) 206 207 208
513
KSC launch complex 39A 39B 39B 39B
Payload Saturn workshop CSM 116 CSM 117 CSM 118
OWS Three-man crew Three-man crew Three-man crew
AM Experiments Experiments Experiments
MDA
ATM
Experiments
Orbital inclination 500 500 500 500
Orbital altitude '234 n mi '234 n mi '234 n mi '234 n mi
Launch interval --------------- 1 day '90 days -180 days
(from SL-1 launch)
Manned flight duration --------------- Up to 28 days Up to 56 days Up to 56 days
39
